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Abstract
The ASVspoof initiative was created to promote the de-
velopment of countermeasures which aim to protect automatic
speaker verification (ASV) from spoofing attacks. The first
community-led, common evaluation held in 2015 focused on
countermeasures for speech synthesis and voice conversion
spoofing attacks. Arguably, however, it is replay attacks which
pose the greatest threat. Such attacks involve the replay of
recordings collected from enrolled speakers in order to provoke
false alarms and can be mounted with greater ease using ev-
eryday consumer devices. ASVspoof 2017, the second in the
series, hence focused on the development of replay attack coun-
termeasures. This paper describes the database, protocols and
initial findings. The evaluation entailed highly heterogeneous
acoustic recording and replay conditions which increased the
equal error rate (EER) of a baseline ASV system from 1.76%
to 30.71%. Submissions were received from 49 research teams,
20 of which improved upon a baseline replay spoofing detector
EER of 24.65%, in terms of replay/non-replay discrimination.
While largely successful, the evaluation indicates that the quest
for countermeasures which are resilient in the face of variable
replay attacks remains very much alive.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, spoofing, coun-
termeasure, replay attacks, ASVspoof
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1, 2, 3] technology is
used in a growing range of applications which require not only
robustness to changes in the acoustic environment, but also re-
silience to intentional circumvention, known as spoofing [4] or,
according to ISO/IEC 30107-1:20161 standard, presentation at-
tacks. Among other possible attack vectors, replay attacks are
a key concern; they can be performed with ease and the threat
they pose to ASV reliability has been confirmed in independent
studies [5, 6, 7]. Replay attacks are mounted using recordings
of a target speaker’s voice which are replayed to an ASV sys-
tem in the place of genuine speech. An example is the use of a
smart-device to replay a recording of a target speaker’s voice to
unlock a smartphone which uses ASV access control.
Spoofing countermeasures have consequently been devel-
oped to protect ASV systems from replay attacks. The liter-
ature shows three general strategies. Prompted-phrase ASV,
e.g. randomised digit sequences [8], and utterance verifica-
tion [9, 10] offer some protection, although multiple recordings
can be remixed to produce a replay attack which matches the
1https://www.iso.org/standard/53227.html
prompted phrase. Copy detection [11, 12], also known as audio
fingerprinting, can also be used to detect recordings of genuine
enrollment utterances or previous access attempts, although this
approach calls for the maintenance of a dynamically growing
database. This paper concerns a third strategy which aims to
detect replay attacks using only the acoustic characteristics of a
given utterance. Arguably, this solution has broader utility; this
includes any ASV approach/system in addition to any form of
replay attack.
The detection of replay attacks using acoustic characterisa-
tion is potentially problematic, however. The difficulty relates
to the unpredictable variation in the quality of a replay attack.
Recordings, perhaps collected surreptitiously, may contain sig-
nificant additive or convolutional noise. The detection of re-
play attacks may then boil down to an ambient or channel noise
classification problem. In contrast, recordings made with high-
quality hardware in benign acoustic environments may be close
to indistinguishable from genuine speech signals. At the limit,
bit-to-bit digital copies of genuine audio recording, perhaps in-
jected into the input circuitry of the ASV system bypassing the
microphone, would be indistinguishable using any method. The
question then is, what are the practical limits of replay attack
detection?
The search for an answer to this fundamental question is
the focus of the ASVspoof 2017 challenge2. ASVspoof 2017
follows two special sessions on spoofing and countermeasures
for automatic speaker verification at INTERSPEECH 2013 [13]
and 2015 [14] which formed the first evaluation, ASVspoof
2015 [15]. The first evaluation promoted the development of
generalised countermeasures capable of protecting ASV from
diverse text-to-speech (TTS) and voice conversion (VC) spoof-
ing attacks [16]. While the mounting of these attacks may re-
quire substantial expertise, replay attacks can be mounted by the
layperson using widely available consumer devices for audio
recording and replaying. ASVspoof 2017 therefore promoted
the development of replay attack countermeasures.
Previous attempts to assess the threat of replay spoofing at-
tacks typically involved a modest number of evaluation condi-
tions, e.g. [5, 6, 7, 17]. Some studies, e.g. [6, 7] report close-
to-perfect recognition accuracy, albeit in the case of relatively
homogeneous acoustic conditions. Other work [5] suggests that
performance may degrade in more practical scenarios where
the acoustic conditions can vary greatly. The primary technical
goals of ASVspoof 2017 are therefore (i) to assess the practi-
cal limitations of replay attack detection and (ii) to promote the
development of countermeasures with potential to detect replay
2http://www.asvspoof.org/
Table 1: Statistics of the ASVspoof 2017 corpus.
Subset # Spk
# Replay # Replay #Utterances
sessions Config Non-replay Replay
Training 10 6 3 1508 1508
Devel. 8 10 10 760 950
Eval. 24 163 112 1298 12922
Total 42 179 125 3566 15380
spoofing attacks ‘in the wild’, namely in highly-varying acous-
tic conditions.
In identical fashion to the 2015 edition, ASVspoof 2017
focuses on standalone spoofing attack detection (here, replay
attacks), i.e. spoofing detection in isolation from ASV. How-
ever, so that the initiative is at least aligned to ASV research and
in contrast to the first edition, ASVspoof 2017 uses the recent
text-dependent RedDots [18] data as the base corpus [19]. One
additional change to the 2015 edition, made in order to encour-
age wider participation, is the provision of a baseline spoofing
classifier [20]. This strategy appears to have had a positive im-
pact; the organisers received 113 requests for access to the de-
velopment set, while a total of 49 primary system scores were
submitted for the evaluation set.
2. ASVspoof 2017 corpus
The ASVspoof 2017 corpus originates from the RedDots cor-
pus3 which was collected by volunteers from across the globe
(mostly ASV researchers) using Android smartphones. Non-
replayed utterances are a subset of the original RedDots record-
ings whereas replayed recordings are replayed and recaptured
versions. The replayed utterances hence correspond to a ‘stolen
voice’ scenario where the attacker has access to a digital copy
of an original target speaker utterance which is then replayed
through transducers of varying quality.
A total of 56% of replay files were collected by four par-
ticipants of the EU Horizon 2020-funded OCTAVE project4,
(see [19]), while the remaining 44% were collected by other
contributors. Replay recordings were collected from the re-
playing and re-recording of concatenated RedDots utterances
with heterogeneous devices and acoustic environments. Non-
replayed evaluation data was supplemented with utterances col-
lected from 7 new speakers.
The ASVspoof 2017 corpus is partitioned into three sub-
sets: training, development and evaluation. Details of each
are presented in Table 1. The first two subsets were pro-
vided to participants for the design of replay detectors (coun-
termeasures), while re-partitioning of the training and develop-
ment subsets was permitted. Metadata consisting of replay/non-
replay ground-truth labels, in addition to speaker ID, phrase ID,
and replay configuration details were provided for the training
and development subsets. Only audio data and phrase ID were
provided for the evaluation set for which participants were re-
quired to submit scores. Results were then determined by the
organisers and returned to participants.
All three subsets are disjoint in terms of speakers. They are
also somewhat disjoint in terms of data collection sites. The
training subset was collected at a single site. The development
subset was collected at the same site in addition to two more
sites. Finally, the evaluation subset was collected at the same
3https://sites.google.com/site/
thereddotsproject/
4https://www.octave-project.eu/
three sites and supplemented with additional data from two new
sites. Nonetheless, even data from the same site was collected
by different people using different recording and replaying de-
vices and in different acoustic environments. The evaluation
subset contains data collected from 163 replay sessions in 112
unique replay configurations5. Data heterogeneity has proven
essential to the development of reliable spoofing countermea-
sures [21, 22, 23].
2.1. Evaluation conditions
The ASVspoof 2017 corpus comprises six evaluation condi-
tions containing a disjoint set of replay trials (and a shared set
of non-replay trials). Since the original RedDots source data
and the ASVspoof 2017 replay recordings were collected in di-
verse conditions, the data exhibits multiple, concurrent varia-
tions (e.g. recording device quality, room dimensions, reverber-
ation in addition to the vocal effort in the original recordings).
The isolation or marginalisation of such variation is particu-
larly challenging. Hence, the six conditions for the ASVspoof
2017 challenge were defined post-evaluation using a clustering
of well-ranked system scores.
To focus on differences in replay configurations rather than
the differences relating to individual utterances, clustering was
applied to scores averaged across individual replay environ-
ments. The clustering process was performed as follows:
1. System scores for all submissions which out-performed the
baseline were linearly fused using the Bosaris6 toolkit to ob-
tain a high-performance ensemble classifier.
2. Fused scores were then averaged across all replay trials cor-
responding to the same replay session (common replay envi-
ronment, playback and recording devices).
3. Averaged scores were then clustered using k-means to obtain
a non-uniform partitioning of the score axis.
4. Resulting score clusters were then re-ordered according to in-
creasing average fused score.
This procedure can be applied to cluster results into a num-
ber of different replay conditions. Those with a lower aver-
age fused score represent replay conditions which are gener-
ally easier to detect than replay conditions with a higher aver-
age fused score. A clustering into 6 different replay conditions
was found empirically to give the most consistent and intuitive
results. Condition C1 represents replay trials with significant
background noise or channel distortion which are typically de-
tected with ease. Condition C6 represents high-quality replay
trials which are comparatively more difficult to detect. A quan-
titative analysis of the conditions in terms of signal quality mea-
sures and error rates is presented in Section 4.2.
2.2. Evaluation metrics
In line with the ASVspoof 2015 challenge, the 2017 edition
concentrates on stand-alone spoofing detection without ASV in-
tegration. The task requires the assignment to a set of audio files
a score which reflects the relative strength of two competing
hypotheses, namely that the trial is non-replayed (genuine) or
5A replay configuration refers to a unique combination of room,
replay device and recording device while a session refers to a set of
source files, which share the same replay configuration.
6https://sites.google.com/site/
bosaristoolkit/
Table 2: Number of trials in the ASVspoof 2017 protocols.
Trial Type Development Evaluation
Genuine 742 1106
Zero-effort Spoof 5186 18624
Replay Spoof 940 11711
Table 3: Performance in terms of EER for a conventional GMM-
UBM text-dependent ASV system.
Imposter Type Development Evaluation
Zero-effort Spoof 3.50 1.76
Replay Spoof 41.96 30.71
replayed (spoofed) speech. Higher scores are assumed to favor
the non-replay/genuine hypothesis. The primary metric is the
equal error rate (EER). Let Pfa(θ) and Pmiss(θ) be the false
alarm and miss rates at threshold θ defined according to:
Pfa(θ) =
#{replay trials with score > θ}
#{Total replay trials}
Pmiss(θ) =
#{non-replay trials with score ≤ θ}
#{Total non-replay trials} ,
so that Pfa(θ) and Pmiss(θ) are, respectively, monotonically de-
creasing and increasing functions of θ. The EER corresponds
to the threshold θEER at which the two detection error rates
are (approximately) equal. It is estimated using the convex
hull method available in the Bosaris toolkit. In contrast to the
ASVspoof 2015 challenge, the EER is computed from scores
pooled across all the trial segments instead of condition aver-
aging. The rationale is to promote the development of replay
attack detectors yielding scores that are more consistent across
variable spoofing conditions; see also [24, Table 12] and [15,
Fig. 6].
3. Impact of replay to ASV accuracy
The vulnerability of ASV systems to replay spoofing attacks
has been confirmed previously by independent teams [6, 7, 25].
This section reports the impact of ASVspoof 2017 replay spoof-
ing attacks on a classical Gaussian mixture model with universal
background model (GMM-UBM) [26] ASV system. This has
been shown [27] to deliver competitive performance for Red-
Dots data consisting of short-duration utterances. The ASV sys-
tem uses Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC) features
and a 512-component UBM trained using RSR2015 [28] and
TIMIT7 databases. Phrase-dependent target speaker models are
created from RedDots enrollment data. The evaluation protocol
involves a number of genuine trials and then either zero-effort
impostor or replay spoofing attack trials. The number of each
are shown in Table 2. Table 3 shows the degradation in ASV
performance when zero-effort impostors are replaced with re-
play spoofing attacks. The baseline EER for speaker discrimi-
nation is seen to increase substantially and illustrates the need
to develop replay attack countermeasures.
4. ASVspoof 2017 challenge results
4.1. Overview
A total of 49 submissions were received. A summary of re-
sults for primary systems is illustrated in Table 4, and in the
7https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/ldc93s1
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Figure 1: Replay/non-replay detection error trade-off (DET)
profiles for the two baseline systems (B01 and B02) and each
of the 49 primary submissions to the ASVspoof 2017 challenge.
Table 4: Performance of the two baseline systems (B1 & B2)
and the 49 primary systems (S01—S48 in addition to late sub-
mission D01) for the ASVspoof 2017 challenge. Results are in
terms of the replay/non-replay equal error rate (EER, %).
ID EER ID EER ID EER ID EER
S01 6.73 S14 22.04 S26 26.98 S38 31.59
S02 12.39 S15 22.23 S27 27.32 S39 31.76
S03 14.31 S16 22.41 S28 27.39 S40 32.59
S04 14.93 S17 23.11 S29 27.45 S41 34.78
S05 16.35 S18 23.19 S30 28.26 S42 35.57
S06 17.62 S19 23.53 S31 28.27 S43 36.05
S07 18.07 S20 23.85 S32 28.29 S44 37.20
S08 18.33 B01 24.65 S33 28.96 S45 38.15
S09 20.20 S21 24.66 S34 30.01 S46 38.51
S10 20.27 S22 25.10 B02 30.17 S47 39.06
S11 21.31 S23 25.19 S35 30.72 S48 45.82
S12 21.48 S24 26.21 S36 31.02 D01 7.39
S13 21.99 S25 26.51 S37 31.38 Avg. 25.91
DET plot of Fig. 1, along with the two baseline replay/non-
replay detectors8. They use a common Gaussian mixture model
(GMM) back-end classifier with constant Q cepstral coefficient
(CQCC) features [20] which are based on a perceptually moti-
vated time-frequency transform [29]. Performance is shown for
two baseline variants trained using either combined training and
development data (B01) or training data alone (B02). The use
of pooled data naturally results in better performance. There
is substantial variation in EERs with 20 of the 49 submissions
achieving better performance than the B01 baseline. This obser-
vation indicates the difficulty of the challenge and stresses the
importance of avoiding over-fitting. The top-performing S01
system achieves a encouraging EER of 6.73 %. The DET plot
in Fig. 1 further indicates that the systems are diverse across all
the operating points not limited to the EER region.
8http://www.asvspoof.org/data2017/baseline_
CM.zip
Table 5: Number of trials and quality measures for the six
ASVspoof 2017 evaluation conditions: number of trials, mean
and standard deviation of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and
cepstral distance (CSD), and quality of playback and recording
devices (L=low, M=medium, H=high).
Category C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
# Replay trials 183 1483 1178 5227 4475 376
SNR µ 28.77 44.81 29.60 34.93 36.05 39.86
SNR σ 7.61 11.22 8.50 8.44 9.59 10.70
CSD µ 0.91 0.82 0.64 0.61 0.45 0.26
CSD σ 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.10
Pl. quality L L L/M L/M M/H H
Rec. quality L/M L/M L/M M/H M/H H
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 Pooled
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Figure 2: A boxplot illustrating the range in performance
for the top-10 performing ASVspoof 2017 submissions. Re-
sults illustrated in terms of replay/non-replay EER (%) broken
down according to the six evaluation conditions defined in Sub-
section 2.1 and for pooled results.
4.2. Condition analysis
Table 5 characterizes the six evaluation conditions derived from
submission scores using the clustering procedure described in
Sub-section 2.1. Illustrated are the mean and standard devia-
tion of two standard quality measures. The signal-to-noise ra-
tio (SNR) reflects the level of background noise and is estimated
using the NIST STNR tool9, while the cepstral distance (CSD)
is a two-sided estimate of the distortion between replay utter-
ances and corresponding source recordings [30]. It corresponds
to the average Euclidean distance between the two recordings
and is estimated from sliding frames of 20ms duration with
10ms overlap and standard cepstral analysis without the DC co-
efficient c0. Low CSD values characterise high-quality replay
attacks, i.e. little distortion.
Table 5 shows an almost-consistent correlation between in-
creasing SNR and difficulty which increases from C1 to C6.
The one exception, namely condition C2, was found to ex-
hibit low background noise but substantial spectral distortion
stemming from the use of low quality replay (a netbook) and
recording (webcam microphone) devices. Table 5 further indi-
cates that the difficulty of each condition is entirely correlated
with CSD; replay configurations which introduce greater dis-
tortion are easier to detect. This is entirely intuitive given that
9https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/itl/iad/mig/spqa_2-3-sphere_2-5.tgz
additional noise, reverberation or other distortion induced by
low-quality playback or recording devices will inherently dis-
tort spectral characteristics. The last two rows of Table 5 il-
lustrate the general quality of the playback/recording devices
which characterise each condition. As expected, replay attacks
mounted with low (L) and medium (M) quality devices are more
easily detected that those mounted with high (H) quality de-
vices.
4.3. System analysis
Fig. 2 illustrates, independently for each of the 6 conditions
and pooled scores, the variation in performance for the top-10
ranked submissions, the B01 baseline system and the best per-
forming S01 submission. Replay detection performance for cat-
egory C6 is consistently the worst. Performance for condition
C1 is often not the best but, for many cases, the variation in per-
formance across C1-C5 is substantial. System S01 is the best
performing for 4 of the 6 conditions and illustrates consistent
and substantial improvements on the baseline.
5. Conclusions
The ASVspoof 2017 challenge was highly successful with more
than 100 development data requests and nearly 50 challenge
submissions. The second edition of the challenge is new in sev-
eral respects. Besides new data for the what is likely to be the
most prolific form of spoofing attack in practice, namely replay,
speech signals are collected ‘in the wild’ in a large number of
heterogeneous recording conditions. Compared to the first chal-
lenge in 2015, the focus is now aligned to a text-dependent ASV
scenario where short pass-phrases are used for speaker authen-
tication. This paper summarises the challenge corpus, task, pre-
liminary evaluation results, and categorization of the evaluation
data for further analysis.
The average EER of all primary submissions is 25.91%
whereas the best single system result shows an average detec-
tion EER of 6.73%. The comparison of these results to those
from the previous challenge shows that the detection of replay
attacks is seemingly more difficult than the detection of speech
synthesis and voice conversion spoofing attacks. Countermea-
sure generalisation also remains an open problem.
Looking to the future, the categorisation of trials according
to observed difficulty needs further investigation. To this end,
the organisers expect that the challenge data, protocols, keys
and evaluation results will be of use to the community in ad-
vancing further the state of the art in anti-spoofing in addition
to helping ASV researchers to explore new and alternative ap-
proaches to protect speaker authentication systems from fraud.
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